On January 1,1999 euro became the currency for 11 member states of the European Union. Since then the dollar-euro exchange rate has completed a full turning. Three years of depreciation of the euro followed by three years of appreciation without wild fluctuations asks for an explanation which would adequately account for the position of the euro as an emerging international currency. In this paper, first we present a concise summary of the theory of world money. Then we apply the theory to explain the development of the exchange rat of euro versus dollar in the subperiods 1999-2002 and 2002-2004. 
Introduction
On January 1,1999 Euro became the currency for 11 member states of the European Union. Since then the Dollar-Euro exchange rate has completed a full turning. Euro depreciated since its introduction steadily and without any major interruption until Dollar replaced its predecessor sterling already in the immediate post-war years as the dominant world money and is today the leading international currency with vast scale economies and externalities due to its long standing international monetary functions (Shams 2002, P. 11) . The common European currency Euro is just in the process of assuming an important role as an international currency. Its introduction induced a discussion on rivalry between Euro and Dollar (Bergsten 2002; Kenen 2002; Cohen 2003) . The approach followed here to explain the development of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate will allow us also to evaluate some arguments on the world money role of both currencies brought up in this discussion.
We first present a concise summary of the theory of world money as discussed in Shams (1983) . Then we apply the theory to explain the development of the exchange rate of Euro versus Dollar in the subperiods 1999-2002 and 2002-2004 . 
The Regionalisation of the World Economy and World Money
One of the basic statement of a full developed theory of world money is that the world economy exhibits a specific structure, which is changing through time and that the world money adjusts to these specific characteristics of the world economy and underlies therefore itself large-scale changes in the long run. To understand the development of the world money and any long-range modification in its manifestation through time one has therefore first to study the dynamic stability of the world economy. To grasp this dynamic stability we propose to conceive the world economy as a living economic unit focussing on the shape and formation of the totality of the international transactions and not on its differentiated parts (international trade, international investment, international finance, etc.). This unique and dynamic movement is best formulated in terms of structural characteristics of the world economy, which could serve its level of development in every moment of time. We propose four different structural characteristics (Shams 1983, pp. 48-124) .
In terms of the totality of international transactions the first structural characteristic is its steady growth. Here we have to focus on the long run, covering centuries and not decades. The second structural characteristic is that this long run growth of the world economy exhibits fluctuations. Periods of downswing supersede periods of upswing covering several decades. Periods of world-wide downswing are characterised by the process of search for new path-breaking technologies and their introduction, testing and development while periods of upswing are characterised by further development, application and exploitation of major technologies. Another structural characteristic of the world economy is the slow process of the intrusion of the market economy into new regions leading to a differentiation of the world economy between developed and underdeveloped regions. After a long process of structural changes some of these regions develop into market economies and become parts of the world economy.
For the purpose of our discussion in this paper the most important structural characteristic is the regionalisation of the world economy. The world economy possesses a specific spatial dynamic which leads to a differentiation of the world economy into regions characterised by a high intensity of intra-regional exchange and a low intensity of inter-regional exchange. This is the result of processes of agglomeration which lead to huge industrial complexes covering usually the territory of several nation states.
Inside industry complexes usually exist a specific division of labour among the respective countries. We can differentiate among central countries and peripheral countries. The peripheries are dependent on the large central countries as markets for their products and the structure of their production is oriented towards these countries. In a world of nation states and the absence of a world government a national money that fulfills all money functions at the level of the world economy will assume the role of an international currency (Shams 1983, pp. 125-130) . The potential of a national currency to assume this role is determined in the first place through the share of the corresponding country in international transactions (Shams 1983, pp. 126-130) .
Depending on the respective structure of the world economy therefore, the national currencies of one or a few central countries must assume the role of an international currency. Since the structure of the world economy changes over time due to the changing interaction of the different structural elements of the world economy, there will be also changes in the roles of the different national monies as international currencies (for details see Shams 1983) .
Euro Depreciation 1999-2002
There up, this will be considered as evidence of strength of US economy. Good news about US economy will be searched for a while bad news will be disregarded. At the same time a declining Euro will trigger a search for bad news about the European economy.
These beliefs then reinforce the movements of the exchange rate. The Dollar increases further and the Euro continues its decline. This process can last for a while. At some points too many discrepancies between facts and beliefs reduce the credibility of the latter and a turn in the market can reverse the process.
Applying this theory to the period 1999-2002 would lead to the conclusion that the decline of the Euro since the beginning of the period was set off by mounting bad news about the European economy outright by introduction of the Euro. The beginning appreciation of the Euro two years later in contrast would have been caused by accumulation of good news which increasingly were contrary to the beliefs about the weakness of the European economy. But the bad news about the European economy originate from a time well before the introduction of the Euro and continue without major interruptions even today after the Euro has appreciated remarkably.
News must have a basis in the real development of the fundamentals and can not lead their own life for long in spite of accumulating facts. The theory assumes that the agents participating at the market do not learn from their past experiences. Otherwise they would realise very soon that beliefs are contrary to the facts and not for long would revise their beliefs. Periods of appreciation and depreciation of a currency would become shorter and shorter until no serious discrepancy would exist between beliefs and facts. The Period 1999-2004 is a too long period to believe in a rational ignorance of economic agents due to uncertainty about the link between fundamentals and the exchange rate.
In another study two different approaches are presented to explain the depreciation of the Euro in 1999-2002 (Meredith 2001) . The first one is based on the surge in U.S.
equity prices since mid-1990s. According to this explanation this surge in equity prices raised market capitalisation relative to GDP to unprecedented levels. This boosted both consumption and investment, leading to a shock on the demand side. The anticipated future impact of this positive demand shock caused the long-term real interest rate to move up sooner than the short term real interest rates. Since the exchange rate is determined by uncovered interest parity, and thus reflects both the current and all expected future interest, this leads to the appreciation of Dollar vis-à-vis Euro (Meredith 2001, P. 20-33) .
Assuming that equity valuations stabilise relative to GDP at the level observed in 2000, Sinn and Westermann (2001) national currency translated via fixed conversion rates automatically into demand and supply for Euro. The Euro depreciation was therefore the result of the depreciation of at least some of these national currencies. To understand the depreciation of the Euro in this period we had therefore to look at the development of the exchange rate of these national currencies. But for this purpose no data exist, since these national currencies, although as a matter of principle absolutely possible, were not notified at the foreign exchange markets.
Euro Appreciation 2002-2004
On February 28, 2002 national banknotes and coins were finally withdrawn from use.
Euro is now not only a denomination currency but also a store of value and a transactions currency (medium of exchange). Just from this time the Euro begins to appreciate for three consecutive years and stabilises at the end of this period at a high Europe's markets for public debt remain segmented, increasing the transactions costs, the anti-growth bias which is built into the institutional structure of the EMU, dampening rates of return on Euro-denominated assets, the Euro area's governance structure which continues to be riddled with ambiguities and obfuscation.
Kenen (2002) Euro come to the conclusion that the Euro has indeed a great potential to expand further its international role but that this will be a long run process, not to be realised in the near future.
The most optimistic view is hold by Bergsten (2002 To a large part this huge deficit must be financed by reserve accumulation of foreign central bank. Regarding the sustainability of this arrangement one risk is the projectionist pressures that are generated by such a large deficit. Important in this respect is also the willingness of external investors to continue to finance these deficits at low rates. There is the risk that at some point in future the interest rate necessary to attract external financing has to rise and/or the exchange rate of the Dollar has to depreciate. The risk of adverse consequences is that supportive macroeconomic policies seems necessary for the needed adjustment to happen smoothly.
Some opinions see no serious risk in current account imbalances. Greenspan (2004) In theoretical terms there is a flaw in this argument. If strong growth leads to trade deficits, the external debt must increase since only part of deficits can be financed by direct investment and acquisition of equities by foreigners who are attracted by the high growth rates. By growing indebtedness at some point in future surpluses in current account are necessary to settle the foreign debt. For this purpose the absorption must be reduced and the exchange rate devalued. Griswold (2001, P. 12) states that because of the larger capital stock the American economy will be more productive, thus expanding the economy and easing the relative burden of servicing the net foreign investment position. But this is only the case if the export capacity is growing concomitantly with the rising productivity. Summers (2004, P. 3) reports that in the last years the composition of investments in United States has changed substantially toward the nontraded goods sector. Moreover, United States is a mature capital exporting economy.
Outward foreign direct investment has substantially exceeded inward foreign direct investment. So the U. S. needs not only to finance a current account deficit but also a huge amount of outward foreign direct investments (Roubini and Setser 2004, P.5) .
Regarding the sustainability of the U. S. current account deficit one important fact which should not be forgotten is that the United States is a centre country. A centre country pays foreign goods with its own money because its money is internationally accepted to settle payment contracts. Reserves denominated in the international currency are accumulated by foreign countries, not because they bear a high interest rate but because they impart international liquidity. Current account deficits of the centre country are easily cleared because surplus countries are ready to hold reserves in the international currency. As long as the national currency of the centre country has not lost its functions as the international currency its current account deficits can be seen as a means to endow the world economy with the necessary international liquidity.
But a national currency functioning as an international money can, as a matter of principle, lose its international monetary functions degrading to its original role as a national currency. This is all too known from Sterling, which enjoyed a high esteem as an international currency well into the 1940s. Is U. S. Dollar going to share the same fate?
For this to happen the world export share of the United States must be falling over a long period. This would imply that the country is steadily losing its international
competitiveness. An ageing economy losing its international competitiveness is characterised at least by three different conditions:
• The current account runs into deficit with no sign of early improvement In the case of the United States there are no signs of an ageing manufacturing industry in the sense just described. But some parts of manufacturing industry is experiencing strong foreign competition especially from low wage countries. The rise of imports from these countries has a high negative impact on trade balance but the manufacturing industry possesses a high adjustment flexibility. Import competition from low wage countries has grave consequences for the U. S. manufacturing sector. A study covering the period 1977to 1997 (Bernard et al. 2002) 
Asian Currencies and Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate: A Digression
Asia is in the process of catching up and is due to become a large-scale industrial complex. In its entirement, Asia is in a process to develop and depart in several industrialised regions with their own centre countries and neighbouring smaller countries oriented towards their respective centres. Accordingly, in the long run, this process will lead to creation of several monetary unions around the currencies of the respective centre countries, which will slowly evolve into international currencies.
Emerging large-scale industrial complexes are characterised by an increasing share of world exports and current account surpluses (Shams 1983, pp. 95-105, 154-169) . As emerging centres, the large countries in such regions develop a high demand for international reserves. This is in accordance with theoretical considerations, where the size of international transactions and political factors (the evolving role as world political actors) prove to be important determinants of reserve holdings.
All this is currently the case in South-East Asia. But the recent large build-up of international reserve holdings of countries in the region is also motivated by the experience of the recent Asian financial crisis. As Aizenman and Marion (2002, P. 25) write "when countries attach more weight to bad outcomes than to good ones, they also find it optimal to hold sizeable precautionary balances of international reserves, even if the opportunity cost is significantly positive". Other advanced economies 
Conclusions
The period 1999-2002 is marked by a permanent fall of the newly created Euro against the Dollar. There exist many explanations for this phenomenon. But at a closer look, none of them seem to be truly convincing. Until the introduction of coins and banknotes, the Euro was not a full-fledged money and its depreciation was therefore simply the result of the depreciation of some national currencies in Europe when converted via fixed conversion rates into Euro.
The appreciation of the Euro after 2002, immediately after the introduction of coins and banknotes, was possibly due to the fact that the Euro became a full-fledged money performing, from that point on, all monetary functions, as well as evolving, as the national currency of a large-scale industrial complex, into the role of an international currency. It is absolutely possible that in future the Euro will grow further in its role as an international currency. But it will not be in a position to displace the U. S. Dollar in its role as an equal important international money. This is due to the fact that, taking the high flexibility of the U. S. manufacturing industry into account, a permanent decrease in the U. S. world market share of exports can not be expected in near future.
